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There is very little empirical evidence on the effects of the minimum wage on prices in the international literature and 
none whatsoever for developing countries.  This paper estimates the minimum wage price effect using monthly Brazilian 
household and firm data from 1982 to 2000 aggregated at a regional level.  Empirical evidence on price effects will help 
to answer the question of who pays for the higher costs: firms, consumers or the unemployed.  The answer to this question 
is a contribution to the controversial recent debate in the literature over the direction of the minimum wage employment 
effect.  Employment might not be affected if firms are able to pass through to prices the higher labour costs associated to 
a minimum wage increase.  In that case, consumers pay for the increase.  Furthermore, if the poor consumers are those 
buying minimum wage labour intensive goods, or if these goods represent a large proportion of their consumption bundle, 
then minimum wage increases might hurt rather than aid the poor.  Moreover, if minimum wage increases cause inflation, 
they will hurt the poor further, who disproportionately suffer from it.  Robust results indicate that the minimum wage 
raises overall prices in Brazil.  The resulting inflation is slightly higher for the poor than for the rich in the long run, 
smaller in low inflation periods, and larger in poorer regions. 
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This paper estimates the effects of minimum wage increases on prices using monthly Brazilian 
household and firm data from 1982 to 2000 aggregated at a regional level. Empirical evidence on 
price effects will help to answer the question of who pays for the higher costs associated to a 
minimum wage increase: firms, consumers or the unemployed.  The answer to this question is a
contribution to the controversial recent debate in the literature over the direction of the minimum
wage employment effect.  That is because employers respond to higher labour costs by reducing 
profits, reducing employment or raising prices:
Profits – There is very little empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that minimum wage
increases are paid out of profits (Card and Krueger, 1995), but economic theory suggests this does not 
occur.  Low wage firms are usually small firms in highly competitive markets and are not sufficiently
profitable to absorb the extra costs.  Even among larger and more profitable firms, capital is highly
mobile and will flow to wherever profits are higher.
Employment – Most of the minimum wage literature has focused on employment effects, 
implicitly assuming that output prices are given, and that firms lower employment in response to 
minimum wage increases, as predicted by the standard neoclassical theory.  This hypothesis, 
however, has been broadly dismissed in the empirical literature.  In his survey, Brown (1999, p.2154) 
remarks:  “the minimum-wage effect is small (and zero is often hard to reject)”.  Small employment
effects, clustered around zero, are becoming prevalent in the literature (Freeman, 1994 and 1996; 
Brown, 1999).  Evidence for Brazil is in line with the international literature (Lemos, 2003a;
Carneiro, 2002; Corseuil and Servo, 2002).
Prices – Although there has been considerable effort to reconcile the standard theory prediction 
of employment decrease in presence of wage increases with the available empirical evidence (Card
and Krueger, 1995; Brown, 1999), little attention has been paid to the theory prediction that an 
industry wide cost shock is passed on to prices.  With employment and profits unaffected, higher 
prices are an obvious response to minimum wage increases.  The assumption of constant prices is 
reasonable if firms that are affected compete with firms that are not affected by the increase, but
unreasonable if the shock is industry wide. It is then important to assume that employment is given
and that firms raise their prices in response to minimum wage increases.  There is very little empirical
evidence on this hypothesis in the international literature, and none whatsoever for developing 
countries.  While there were over 300 studies on the employment effects by 1995 (Card and Krueger, 
1995), only 3 studies had been written on price effects by then for the US (Wessels, 1980; Katz and 
Krueger, 1992; Spriggs and Kelin, 1994), plus US Labour Department reports FLSA 1965 and 1969;
MWSC, 1981).
The international literature mainly utilizes US data for the food sector – which employs a
disproportionate share of minimum wage workers – implicitly assuming the overall prices given.
Lemos (2004) surveys the available literature
1 and concludes that, despite of different methodologies,
data periods and data sources, most studies found that a 10% minimum wage increase raises food 
prices by about 4% and overall prices by about 0.4%.  Brown (1999, p. 2150) in his survey
2 remarks,
“the limited price data suggest that, if anything, prices rise after a minimum wage increase”.
1 These include: Gramlich (1976), Falconer (1978), Gordon (1975, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1988), Frye and Gordon (1981),
Wessels (1980), Sellekaerts (1981), Oaxaca and Cox (1981), Wolf and Nadiri (1981), Katz and Krueger (1992), Card and 
Krueger (1995), Spriggs and Klein (1994), Wilson (1998), Lee and O’Roark (1999), MacDonald and Aaronson (2002),
Aaronson (2001), Aaronson et al. (2003), MaCurdy and O’Brien-Strain (1997 and 2000), O’Brien-Strain (1999), O’Brien-
Strain and MaCurdy (2000), MaCurdy and McIntyre (2001) and Machin et al. (2003).
2 Where only Wessels (1980), Katz and Krueger (1992) and Card and Krueger (1995) are reviewed.
1Both overall and sectoral price effects are small in the US because minimum wage increases are
small and the percentage of minimum wage workers is also small.  For example, according to Card
and Krueger (1995), a 15% minimum wage increase was predicted to raise the prices of (fast-food)
restaurants by 2.2% for a labour’s share in total cost of 30%.  A 15% increase in the price of a factor 
that is itself about 30% of costs, raises overall prices by little enough to be ignored.  Perhaps because
price effects are small in the US, little further research has been done.  However, this evidence might 
not carry out to other developed and developing countries.
Larger price effects are expected in Brazil.  Consider the 15% nominal minimum wage average 
increase in the sample period.  In Pernambuco, a poor region, 11% of workers earn one minimum
wage.  Assuming 30% labour’s share (for comparison purposes), overall prices are expected to 
increase by 0.5%.  If not only those at, but also those below the minimum wage have wage increases 
(33% of workers), prices are expected to increase by 1.5%.  If finally not only those at and below, but 
also those earning 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5 and 3 times the minimum wage have wage increases (46% of 
workers), prices are expected to increase by 2.1%.  For a rich region, Sao Paulo, these effects range 
from 0.2% to 1.8%.  These effects are ten times larger when the largest increase in the sample period 
(150%) is considered.  Such effects are large because of three reasons: the percentage of workers
affected is large; minimum wage increases are large and frequent; and the indexer and numeraire
roles that the minimum wage plays in Brazil.
Further to contributing to the minimum wage debate, answering the question of who pays for the 
increase is an important contribution for welfare analysis (Freeman, 1996).  Absent profits and 
employment losses, the minimum wage is an anti-poverty program that transfers money from one 
group to another.  The effectiveness of this program is a question of redistribution.  If the poor are the 
consumers of minimum wage labour intensive goods, or if these goods represent a large share of their 
consumption bundle, then minimum wage increases might hurt the poor.  Moreover, if such increases
cause inflation, they might hurt rather than aid the poor, who disproportionately suffer from  it.  This
is particularly so in the presence of hyperinflation, as in Brazil.  Extending the understanding of 
minimum wage effects both on prices and in developing countries is crucial if the minimum wage is 
to be used as a policy to help poor people in poor countries.
Robust results indicate that the minimum wage significantly raises overall prices in Brazil.  The 
resulting inflation is slightly higher for the poor than for the rich in the long run, smaller in low 
inflation periods and larger in poorer regions.  This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents 
the data.  Section 3 provides the theoretical foundation for the empirical equation discussed in Section 
4 (Section 4.1), which also discusses identification (Section 4.2), presents (Sections 4.3 and 4.4) and 
analyses the results (Section 4.5).
2. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
2.1 MINIMUM WAGE 
Regional minimum wages in Brazil existed since its introduction in 1940 until 1984, when it 
became national.  Coverage has always been full; there are no differentiated minimum wage rates for
specific demographic groups or labour market categories.
3
Over time, the real minimum wage fell.  This is because of its impact on both the inflation and
the public deficit.  First, after a steep decrease, the real minimum wage was adjusted and reached its 
peak during the 50s boom.  It then fell as a result of the subsequent recession.  After the dictatorship
3 Accommodation and food costs can be deducted from the wage.  That might account for some below minimum wage 
workers, although the majority of those are informal sector workers.
2installed in 1964 associated high inflation with wage adjustments, the real minimum wage was
systematically under-indexed.  As a result, rational agents took increases in the minimum wage as a 
signal for price and wage bargains – even after law forbade its use as indexor and numeraire in 1987. 
Second, because minimum wage increases affect the public deficit – uncontrollably large and 
growing in the 80s and 90s via benefits, pensions, and the public sector wage bill – the fiscal impact
was often a constraint to the size of the increase (Foguel et al. 2001).
If on the one hand holding constant the nominal minimum wage was used as a deflationary 
policy, on the other hand increases in the nominal minimum wage severely affected both prices and 
the public deficit and were therefore inflationary.  This effect was perpetuated in a wage-price 
inflation spiral.  Minimum wage indexation and reinforced inflationary expectations was a 
phenomenon first noticed by Gramlich (1976), Cox and Oaxaca (1981) and Wolf and Nadiri (1981);
and more recently discussed by Card and Krueger (1995) and Freeman (1996).  Maloney and Nunes
(2003) show that the indexer and numeraire effects are a general phenomenon in Latin America.
Graph 1.a and 1.b show the nominal and real hourly minimum wage between 1982 and 2000.
4
With the end of the dictatorship, nominal minimum wage adjustments were subject to the rules of 
five different stabilization plans.  Plano Cruzado, in February of 1986, increased the minimum wage 
by 15% and introduced bi-annual adjustments, which would override should inflation be higher than
20%.  Nonetheless, the minimum wage was 25% lower in June of 1987, when Plano Bresser was 
implemented.  Wages were then frozen for 3 months and after that, they were indexed monthly by 
past inflation.  Plano Verao, in January of 1989, again froze prices.  From May of 1989, adjustments
were made monthly; nonetheless, the minimum wage was 45% lower by March of 1990, when Plano 
Collor was implemented.  In September 1991, indexation was restricted to workers earning up to 3 
times the minimum wage.  In 1993 adjustments were bi-monthly and then monthly.  In March of 
1994, a daily indexer was introduced as a prelude for Plano Real in July of 1994, when the minimum
wage decreased by 40% followed by a 42% increase in May of 1995.  Since then, it has been 
annually adjusted.  The result of these indexation rules is the saw-toothed pattern in Graph 1.b, 
particularly remarkable within years of high inflation.
2.2 PRICE
The price data is the National Consumers Price Index (INPC), the National Wide Consumer
Price Index (IPCA) and the Necessary Minimum Wage (SMN), all of which disaggregated by region. 
The choice of the price measure is very important in a high inflationary environment such as the one 
experienced in Brazil in the last 30 years.  INPC (IPCA) is computed over the consumption bundle of 
households earning between 1 and 8 (1 and 40) minimum wages (Gonzaga and Machado, 2002); 
INPC puts more weight on goods consumed by poorer households.  The correlation between the two 
is 0.99 both in levels and in differences.  SMN is computed over the consumption bundle of 
households earning 1 minimum wage as defined in the Constitution, i.e., the subsistence income for
an adult worker and his/her family.  Even though such a bundle has been unaffordable at the 
prevalent minimum wage, this is the effective inflation experienced by a household with subsistence 
levels of consumption.  The correlation between SMN and INPC/IPCA, is 0.99 (0.88) in levels 
(differences).  Graph 1.c shows the three indices over time.  SMN is largest during the whole sample
period, but the pattern over time is similar for the three indices.  The main price data is INPC;
robustness checks using IPCA and SMN are performed (Section 4.4).
4 Wages are set monthly in Brazil.  The hourly minimum wage rate is obtained by dividing the monthly minimum wage 
by 44x4.3 after, and 48x4.3 until September of 1988, when the new Constitution shortened the working week.  The hourly
wage rate is obtained by dividing monthly earnings by 4.3 times the number of hours worked weekly.
3The raw correlation of price and the nominal minimum wage is 0.99 (0.55) in levels 
(differences).  The pattern both in levels and in differences of the two is remarkably synchronized; 
this was also documented for the US (Aaronson, 2001).  The other data is from PME (Monthly
Employment Survey), PIM (Pesquisa Industrial Mensal), SONDA (Sondagem Industrial) and 
BACEN (Banco Central do Brasil).  All data is available from the IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatistica) and FGV (Fundacao Getulio Vargas).
3. THEORETICAL GROUNDING
The price effect studies available in the literature are grounded on the standard theory model
prediction that if employers do not respond to changes in the minimum wage by reducing 
employment or profits, they respond by raising prices.  However, none of them discusses explicitly 
the theoretical model that delivered their empirical equation specification (Lemos, 2004).  This 
requires a more careful discussion.
Economic theory establishes various routes through which the minimum wage affects prices: (1) 
via labour demand, by pushing firm costs and prices upwards; (2) via labour supply, by increasing 
labour productivity, pushing prices downwards; or by increasing labour force participation, pushing 
wages (prices) downwards; (3) via aggregate supply, by decreasing employment and output, pushing 
wages and prices upwards; and (4) via aggregate demand, by increasing spending, pushing prices 
upwards; or by stopping those who became unemployed to spend, pushing prices downwards; or by 
decreasing the demand for (now more expensive) minimum-wage-labour-intensive-products, pushing 
prices downwards.  All these routes, together with a rapidly changing economy, make it very difficult 
to isolate the price effects due to a minimum wage increase.
To account for all such routes, a simple standard general equilibrium model is constructed.  The
model consists of four equations (to solve for employment, wages, prices, and output).  An alternative
specification is then derived under imperfect competition, where the price equation is specified as a
markup over cost.  Both the general equilibrium reduced form equation and the imperfect competition
profit maximizing equation are used to deliver the empirical equations estimated in Section 4. 
General Equilibrium – Assume perfect competition in both the input and output markets, and a 
production function depending on labour and capital, Y=fLK(L,K), with input and output prices W, r,
and P.  Maximization of profits at the (representative) firm level delivers the aggregate unconditional 
demand for labour, L
d=L(P,W,r), which can be re-written as P=P1(L
d,W,r).  There is no sense in a 
price equation at the (price-taker) firm level, but at the industry level, the labour demand function is 
well defined.  The minimum wage then affects prices through its effects on wages and on 
productivity.  If the production function depends on capital and two types of labour (say skilled, paid 




d,W,MW,r). This shows the relationship between aggregate prices and labour demand that
follows from the firm behaviour.  This equation might not be very informative, as it tells what 
happens to prices when the minimum wage changes, holding constant employment.  However, it 
reflects the implicit assumption discussed in Section 1 that when holding employment constant, the
minimum wage increase is passed on to prices.  The specification estimated by Aaronson (2001) can 
be thought of as a labour demand curve. 




shifters are supply shocks; and L
s=L
d=L is used to eliminate W, the labour market equilibrium 
condition is P=P2(L,r,L
s-shifters).  The minimum wage can be included among the supply shocks or, 
as above, enter the equation directly, P=P
’
2(L,MW,r,L
s-shifters).  This equation tells what happens to 
4prices when the minimum wage changes, accounting for the response of both firms and workers, 
holding constant other input prices, employment and labour supply factors.







s-shifters).  Subtracting and dividing both sides by 
lagged price delivers the Phillips curve.  This equation summarizes the possible combinations of price 
and output that equilibrates the labour market.  Once more, it might not be very informative, as it tells
what happens to prices when the minimum wage changes, holding output constant
Most people will adjust their spending in response to higher prices.  This determines whether and 
where jobs are lost and output is cut in the longer-run.  The relationship between prices and the 
minimum wage needs to account not only for aggregate supply but also for aggregate demand effects. 
If Y
d=Y
s=Y is used, where Y
d=f(P,Y
d-shifters), and Y
d-shifters are demand shocks; the economy








This equation differs from previous ones because, in econometrics parlance, is a reduced form.  It 
tells what happens to prices when the minimum wage changes, accounting for responses of firms,
workers and consumers; i.e. it accounts for the interaction of all the above variables and their joint 
effect on prices.  The (net) minimum wage coefficient is positive because the minimum wage 
increase contracts the economy and increases prices.  The specifications estimated by Card and 
Krueger (1995), Sprigs and Klein (1994), Aaronson and Macdonald (2002) and Machin et al. (2003)
can be thought of as reduced form equations.
Imperfect Competition – Assume a number of identical imperfectly competitive firms, each one 
of them with some market power; say that firms and consumers differ in their physical location and 
each firm has its own market area.  If a demand and a cost relation are specified and the resulting
profit maximizing condition is inverted, a price equation is obtained, where price is a markup over 
costs, P=[e/(1+e)]c, and e is the price elasticity of demand. Note that the two main components of 
costs are labour productivity and wages (and the minimum wage affects both), which already 
accounted for in the first equation of the above general equilibrium model.  Indeed, relaxing the price 
taking assumption does not change dramatically the above specifications – the cost function is the 
same for both monopolists and competitive firms – although it gives a different flavor to the 
interpretation of the results.  The crucial difference here is that while for competitive markets, price is
exogenous and the price equation is a standard labour demand function, for price-setter firms, the
price equation reveals a relationship that must hold for profit maximization but it is not a labour 
demand function, because prices are chosen jointly with employment.  The minimum wage 
coefficient is expected to be positive: a minimum wage increase raises labour costs and prices of the 
entire industry.
4. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND IDENTIFICATION 
The positive raw correlation between log nominal minimum wage and log price discussed in
Section 2.2 needs to be proved robust when the effect of other variables (demand and supply shocks)
on prices is controlled for.  The particular choice of controls is given by theory (Section 3).  Given 
that so little work has been done in this area, the approach of this paper is rather exploratory, aiming 
at a theoretically informed statistical investigation.  The strategy here is to estimate various
specifications grounded on the two models discussed in Section 3 in order to check the robustness of 
the minimum wage effect to alternative controls.
5 One of the Y
d-shifters has to be a nominal variable (e.g. nominal Government expenditure or the money stock) to ensure
that Y
d (P) is homogeneous of degree zero (one) in nominal magnitudes.
54.1 EMPIRICAL EQUATION
While empirical work on the price response to minimum wage increases is limited, there is a 
large empirical literature on the price response to changes in other industry wide costs, such as sales 
taxes and exchange rates.
6  Because of this, the empirical equation delivered by the theoretical
models in Section 3 will be discussed in the light of this so-called pass-through literature.  This 
literature is primarily concerned with the burden of higher costs on consumers, and thus is well suited 
to study the extent to which higher labour costs associated to minimum wage increases are passed on 
to consumers.  The primary objective is to measure whether 100% of the shock is passed through or 
not.  This is estimated by a reduced form equation where price is explained by a cost shock and other 
controls (grounded on the imperfect competition model in Section 3).
Together with the pass-through literature, the aggregate supply and Phillips curve empirical
literature (grounded on the general equilibrium model in Section 3) also provides guidance for the 
empirical price equations specification.  Econometric explanation of inflation requires not only inertia 
and aggregate demand variables, but also supply shocks (e.g. oil price, exchange rate, productivity 
growth, etc.) and Government intervention or push-factors (e.g. minimum wage, social security taxes, 
employment protection, unions, etc.).
7
Approximating the theoretical price equation by a logarithmic function and modelling time and 
regional fixed effects using dummies:
it t i it it it it it it t it v f f Z K L C r W MW f P             P N O 9 G J E   (1) 
where, for region i and time t:   is log prices; MW  is log nominal minimum wage; W  is average of 
log nominal wages; r  is nominal interest rate; C  is average costs;  is employment rate (and hours
worked);  is capital;  is labour supply and aggregated demand shifters;   is regional fixed







it Z i f
f f  is the intercept; and v  is the error term.  Labour supply shifters 
control for region specific demographics potentially correlated with the minimum wage, e.g. the
proportion of workers in the population who are:  young, younger than 10 years old, women,
illiterates, retired, students, in the informal sector, in urban areas, in the public sector, in the building
construction and in the metallurgic industry sector, basic education degree holders, high school 
degree holders and the proportion of workers with a second job.  Aggregate demand shifters include 
consumption, Government expenditure, capital investment, imports, exports and taxes. 
it
Several coefficients are in turn constrained to zero.  The starting place is an ad hoc specification
where f , E , and O  only are allowed to be nonzero.  The empirical counterpart of the general 
equilibrium reduced form price equation is obtained if f , E , G , N , and P  are nonzero, and the
imperfect competition profit maximizing equation, if  f , E , J , and 9  are nonzero.  Each of these 
two equations was estimated assuming Y=fL(L) and Y=fLK(L,K).  Assuming that labour is the only 
6 See Kotlikoff and Summers (1987) for a compendium on tax incidence and Poterba (1996) for a survey.  Some authors
found full pass-through (Poterba, 1996) and others, overshifting (Besley and Rosen, 1994) in contrast with partial pass-
through in the earlier literature (Haig and Shoup, 1934). The literature on the impact of exchange rate movements on
import and export prices (Goldberg and Knetter, 1997) usually finds partial pass-through (Gron and Swenson, 1996; Lee, 
1997; Yang, 1997).  As in the minimum wage price effects literature (Lemos, 2004), the sale taxes and exchange rate
literature also used before-and-after, input-output and econometrics analysis.
7 See Ball et al. (1988) and Goodfriend and King (1990) for surveys on prices and inflation modeling.  For early work on
the role of push factors, see Frye and Gordon (1981), Gordon (1982), and Layard and Nickell (1985 and 1986); for more
recent work, see Jackman et al. (1996) and Staiger et al. (1996).
6variable factor in the long run is equivalent to constraining the coefficients of capital and interest rate 
(G  and N ) to be zero.    Furthermore, static specifications are too restrictive.  Assuming that the 
static specification is valid at each period, dynamics can be added to account for adjustment costs.
This is because an increase in the minimum wage might not affect prices contemporaneously, but in 
future periods, as the inability to adjust other inputs instantaneously creates lagged responses in 
prices.  The effect of the minimum wage on prices over time is typically modeled by including lags of 
the minimum wage as regressors.  The number of lags is an empirical matter (Section 4.3).
All models were estimated in first-differences, as it is usual in the literature.  Dummies, past 
inflation, controls and the constant were included after differencing; regional dummies model region 
specific trends because regions are expected to grow at different rates.  The constant is the base 
dummy.  The models were White-corrected  and sample size weighted, to account for the relative
importance of each region (and for heteroskedasticity arising from aggregation).  Serial correlation
was assumed to vanish after differencing, adding dynamics, controls, regional and time dummies.
4.2 IDENTIFICATION
Most minimum wage price effect studies use the nominal minimum wage as their shock variable. 
However, the minimum wage is national in Brazil (Section 2.1) and full identification requires the 
shock variable to vary across regions.  The typical minimum wage variable used in employment
models is “Kaitz index” (Kaitz, 1970), defined as the ratio of the minimum wage to average wage
adjusted for coverage of the legislation.  Another minimum wage variable is “fraction affected”, 
defined as the proportion of workers earning a wage between the old and the new minimum wage 
(Card, 1992).  Card and Krueger (1995) and Spriggs and Klein (1994) used this variable in their price 
equations.  A variable closely related to “fraction affected” is “fraction at” the minimum wage, 
defined as the proportion of workers earning one minimum wage (Dolado et al., 1996) (plus or minus
0.02%, to account for rounding approximations).
Although the Kaitz index varies across regions and over time, the variation in average wages is 
what drives the variation in the ratio.  As a result, the effect of the inverse of the average wages on 
prices is what would be ultimately estimated (Welch and Cunningham, 1978; Freeman, 1982).
Brown (1999, p. 2130) advocates that the “degree of impact” measures (e.g., “fraction affected”) are 
conceptually cleaner than the “relative minimum wage” variable (e.g., Kaitz index).  He also notes 
that “fraction affected” is “not well-suited for papering periods when the minimum wage is constant,
and so its impact should be declining.  While there is more to be learned from a year in which the
minimum wage increases by 10 or 15% more than average wages than from a year of modest decline, 
the periods between increases should together contain about as much information as the periods of 
increase.”  In other words, fraction is constant at zero regardless of how unimportant the minimum
wage might become.  “Fraction at” is conceptually related to “fraction affected” but does not suffer 
from the same drawback, as it can be defined even when the minimum wage is constant.  Beyond 
statistical identification, “fraction at” is a measure of wage (price) inflation and thus well suited to
study minimum wage price effects.  Its correlation with the real minimum wage, the Kaitz index and 
“fraction affected” in the sample period is respectively 0.61, 0.67 and 0.10. 
Even though “fraction at” has regional variation, modeling time effects with interactions of 
month and year dummies would eliminate all the variation in the model.  Each dummy would capture 
all that affects prices in each month – including discrete and systematic minimum wage increases and 
the associated variation in “fraction at”.  As a result, there would be no variation but noise left to 
identify the minimum wage effect.  Because of that, time effects are modeled by year and month
dummies but not their interaction; this controls for unobserved fixed effects across years and months
7(Burkhauser et al.; 2000).  Also, stabilization plan dummies
8 are included to capture common macro
shocks under each stabilization plan.
4.3 RESULTS 
To ensure identification, log nominal minimum wage in Equation (1) is replaced by “fraction at”.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 show positive and significant estimates.  The coefficient of “fraction at”
in the ad hoc price model compares to the one in the wage model in Lemos (2003a).  A 10% increase
in the minimum wage (increases “fraction at” by 0.3 percentage points and)
9 increases prices by
0.15% and (average) wages by 0.08%; the ratio between the two is 1.7.  Card and Krueger (1995) 
calculate this ratio (their minimum wage variable is “fraction affected”) to be between 0.25 and 0.50. 
The larger ratio here is a result of the indexer and numerarie roles played by the minimum wage in 
Brazil (Section 2.1).
The estimates are larger for models assuming Y=fL(L) and dynamics.  Dynamics allowed the 
effect of “fraction at” on prices to take one year to be complete.  Not all lagged minimum wage 
coefficient estimates were individually significant, but they were jointly significant.  These are long
dynamics.  Even though the rapid wage-price spiral in Brazil discussed in Section 2.1 suggests short 
dynamics, other factors such as the minimum wage indexer and numeraire roles, and long 
inflationary memory in Brazil might perpetuate the minimum wage effect on prices over time.
10
Aaronson (2001) and Macdonald and Aaronson (2001) included lags and leads in their specifications 
and found that most of the prices response occurs in the two-month period immediately after a 
minimum wage increase, while the rest occurs in a two months window around this.  They argue that 
the short dynamics is because the minimum wage changes do not generate the sort of coordination
failure and stickiness in prices that other costs or demand shocks produce.
A 10% increase in the minimum wage raises prices by 0.08%-0.56% and 1.98%-3.07% in the
short and long run across models, suggesting partial pass-through.  The preferred specification is the 
one delivered by the general equilibrium equation assuming dynamics and the more complete 
production function, i.e., column 2, panel B, row 1 of Table 1.  This specification is more reliable 
conceptually and statistically: it is a reduced form equation; the effect of the shock variable on prices
over time is accounted for through dynamics; adjustments in capital and other inputs in response to 
minimum wage increases are allowed for; and errors are expected to be serially uncorrelated.  Using 
this specification, a 10% increase in the minimum wage raises prices by 0.32% and 2.38% in the 
short and long run.  This result is robust when using the imperfect competition specification, and
smaller than results using the less complete production function.  This suggests that the estimates are 
sensitive to whether or not the interest rate is held constant but robust to whether or not perfect 
8 Each had very particular rules (Abreu, 1992); macro shocks were similar within, and different across plans.
Additionally, a dummy was defined in October 1988, when the new Constitution shortened the working week and
introduced an and alternative shorter working day.
9 The 0.3 factor was obtained by regressing the difference of “fraction at” on the difference of the log of nominal
minimum wage and controls associated to each empirical equation.  Because the nominal minimum wage does not vary
across regions in Brazil, the Kaitz index (using not only average wage, but also median wage, 25
th and 10
th percentile
wage as the denominator) was also used.  The 0.3 estimate was remarkably robust across specifications.
10 Because of that, a finite number of lags might censor the adjustment process. A parsimonious way to allow for infinite
number of lags is to include lagged price as a regressor.  This captures any residual effect of the minimum wage on prices
not captured by lags of the minimum wage explicitly.  However, the lagged price coefficient was not significant and the
“fraction at” coefficient was robust.  Results were also robust to including 6, 18 and 24 lags of “fraction at”.  Models
allowing half a year dynamics severely censored dynamics; models allowing over a year dynamics produced non-
significant higher lags coefficients.
8competition is assumed (Section 3).  These results are sizeable for overall price effects; the existing
literature reports less than 4% food sector price effect, and 0.4% overall price effects (Section 1).
Price effects across regions differ as regional consumption patterns differ.  Regions that have a 
higher cost of living or that consume more carry more of the burden (MaCurdy and McIntyre, 2001). 
Increasing the minimum wage by 10% increases “fraction at” by 0.4 (0.1) percentage points in PE 
(SP), a poor (rich) region, and increases prices by 0.42% (0.11%) in the short run and by 3.17% 
(0.79%) in the long run using the preferred specification.  In other words, it causes four times more 
inflation in PE than in SP.
4.4 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
4.4.1 Who Pays The Bill 
The evidence so far is supportive of the hypothesis discussed in the Section 1 that minimum
wage increases are passed on to prices and are, therefore, born by consumers.  Furthermore, this 
evidence suggests that overall prices increase and, therefore, all consumers – not just minimum wage
labour intensive goods consumers – pay for the increase.
However, even in the presence of overall price effects, different consumers need not be affected 
in the same way.  The implicit assumption in the literature is that the largest increase in prices
following a minimum wage increase occurs in minimum wage labour intensive goods industries. 
This means that the consumers of such goods pay proportionately more for the increase.  It has been 
suggested that these consumers are the low income (Freeman, 1996; Deere et al., 1996; O’Brien-
Strain and MaCurdy, 2000; MaCurdy and McIntyre, 2001).  To test that, industry and consumption 
level data are required to identify what are such goods and who are their consumers.  This would
make it possible to define the typical low and high income consumption bundle and the respective 
income share spent on minimum wage labour intensive goods.  This is what SMN, INPC and IPCA
measure; i.e. the cost of the low, medium and high income typical consumption bundle and the 
implicit income share spent on minimum wage labour intensive goods.  These indices can then be 
used to provide evidence on who pays for the increase.  The relevant question here is whether the 
inflation caused by minimum wage increases affects the poor more severely.
Recall Graph 1.c that shows log of SMN, INPC and IPCA over time.  SMN is largest during the
whole sample period, suggesting that inflation was highest for the poor; the pattern over time is
similar for the three indices, suggesting that all consumers were affected by the same inflation 
growth.  If, in the absence of minimum wage increases, prices rose equally to all consumers, then the
simple comparison of indices would be an estimate of the relative inflation experienced by the poor 
and the rich following a minimum wage increase.  However, changes in prices might also be due to 
changes in other variables.  Regression models were used to control for such variables.  SMN and
IPCA were used, in addition to INPC, to re-estimate the dynamic models specified in Section 4.2. 
The pass-through coefficient in these models measures the increase on the prices of goods consumed
by the poor and the rich following a minimum wage increase.  If this coefficient is the same in both 
equations, then the inflation caused by minimum wage increases is the same to poor and rich 
consumers.  If, however, it is larger for low income consumers, then the poor are exposed to higher 
inflation following a minimum wage increase.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 show positive and significant pass-through coefficient for low and 
high income consumers.  A 10% increase in the minimum wage raises low (high) income consumers
prices by 0.30%-0.42% (0.28%-0.55%) and 2.42%-2.91% (1.78%-2.88%) in the short and long run 
across models.  Using the preferred specification (Section 4.3), a 10% increase in the minimum wage
raises prices by 0.30% (0.30%) % and 2.56% (2.19%) in the short and long run.  In other words, the 
9inflation caused by the minimum wage is the same for low and high income consumers in the short
run, but a little larger for low income in the long run.  This suggests that, whoever the consumers of 
minimum wage labour intensive goods are (low or high income), they are affected roughly in the 
same way.  Contrary to what is assumed in the literature, either low income consumers do not spend a 
much larger share of their incomes on minimum wage labour intensive goods, or the prices of such 
goods do not go up by much more, or both.  Both explanations are at work for Brazil.  Minimum 
wage workers are present in various sectors throughout the economy, thus the prices of a wide range 
of goods go up.  Furthermore, the indexer and numeraire roles, and the spillover effects “propagate”
the increase throughout the economy, increasing overall prices.  As a result, consumers of all income
levels (not only low income consumers) spend a substantial income share on goods whose prices 
went up (which are not only minimum wage labour intensive goods).
This is not to say that the effect of the minimum wage on prices across the income distribution is
neutral.  The poor undoubtedly suffer disproportionately more from any given inflation rate – which 
can be compared with a regressive sales tax (MaCurdy and McIntyre, 2001; O’Brien and MaCurdy, 
2000).  However, it is important to establish that in Brazil the poor are not exposed to a higher
inflation rate immediately following a minimum wage increase – although they are exposed to a 
slightly higher inflation rate after a year of adjustments.  MaCurdy and McIntyre (2001) find that 
when expressed as the income share of consumption, the extra costs in higher prices is slightly above 
1% for families of all income groups in the US. 
4.4.2 The Bill Is Smaller Under Low Inflation 
The dynamic models specified in Section 4.2 were re-estimated excluding the high inflation 
period prior to July of 1994.  Column 5 of Table 1 shows positive but not statistically significant
estimates.  The pass-through estimates across models reduced to 0.01% and 0.59%-0.72% in the short 
and long run.  Using the preferred specification (Section 4.3), a 10% increase in the minimum wage
raises prices by 0.01% and 0.63% in the short and long run.  The long run coefficient is now four 
times smaller than the one in Section 4.3, even though all models include time and region fixed 
effects to account for the unusually high inflation periods.  The short run effect is now comparable
with the 0.02% effect in the international literature reports (Section 1).  Aaronson (2001) found 
evidence that the high inflation in the 1970s-1980s partially drives the pass-through coefficient in the 
US and Canada.  Weiss (1993) argues that prices adjustments differ in countries that have
experienced low and high inflation.
In summary, minimum wage increases significantly increase overall prices in Brazil.  (1) The 
pass-through coefficient is larger in the long run when firms have had the chance to adjust to the 
higher costs and the effect of the minimum wage on prices is complete.  (2) The pass-through 
coefficient is the same for low, medium and high income consumers in the short run, and slightly 
larger for lower income consumers in the long run, suggesting that the inflation caused by the 
minimum wage is roughly the same for the poor and the rich. (3) The pass-through coefficient is four
times smaller in the long run under low inflation when firms are less able to adjust prices.  (4) The 
pass-through coefficient is four times larger in a poor than in a rich region.  These findings are robust 
to a number of specifications.  They are in line with theory and with the international empirical
literature.  They are also in line with the hypothesis in the Brazilian literature that minimum wage
increases are an important component of inflation (Section 2.1).
104.5 RECONCILING WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT MINIMUM WAGE EFFECTS 
As discussed in Section 1, theory and empirical evidence on the minimum wage employment
effects are at odds.  On the one hand, standard economic theory unambiguously predicts that 
employment decreases in the presence of wage increases.  On the other hand, although empirical
evidence has established that minimum wage increases raise the wage of the poor, there is no 
consensus on whether this drives employment increases or decreases (Card and Krueger, 1995; 
Brown, 1999).  The evidence for Brazil is in line with the international evidence: employment effects
are small, not always negative and not always statistically significant, despite of sizeable wage effects
(Lemos, 2003a; Carneiro, 2002; Corseuil and Servo, 2002).
The evidence in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 suggests partial pass-through effect of the minimum wage
on prices.  This evidence reconciles theory and empirical evidence.  Evidence of sizeable wage and 
price effects, and small employment effects is consistent with an inelastic labour demand curve and a 
rapid wage-price spiral under high inflation (Section 2.1).  This suggests that firms respond to 
minimum wage increases not by reducing production, but by raising prices.  That is because firms do 
not incur in adjustment costs if they can pass through to prices the higher costs associated to 
minimum wage increases.  Moreover, it suggests that firms are more able to increase prices when
inflation is high.  Cox and Oaxaca (1981) argue that the effects of a minimum wage increase depend
on the accompanying monetary policy.  An accommodating inflationary monetary policy offsets the 
disemployment effect of the minimum wage and increases prices.
CONCLUSION
There is very little evidence on the effects of the minimum wage on prices in the international
literature and none whatsoever for developing countries.  This paper estimates this effect using 
monthly Brazilian household and firm data for the 80s and 90s.  Given that so little work has been 
done in this area, the approach is rather exploratory, aiming at a theoretically informed statistical 
investigation.
Robust results suggest that the minimum wage significantly increases overall prices in Brazil.  A 
10% increase in the minimum wage raises prices by 0.32% and 2.38% in the short and long run, 
suggesting partial pass-through.  These are sizable in the context of the minimum wage literature, 
which reports less than 4% increase in the food sector prices, and 0.4% overall price effects.  This is 
because of the high inflation environment in Brazil over the last decades, as well as the indexer and 
numeraire roles played by the minimum wage in this context.  It is also because of large and frequent 
minimum wage increases, large spillover effects and the presence of minimum wage workers in 
industries other than the low wage.  At a regional level, the minimum wage causes four times more
inflation in a poor region than it does in a rich one. 
Further to filling a gap in the existing literature, these findings are an important contribution for
two reasons.  On the one hand, they help to reconcile the controversial recent minimum wage debate 
of sizeable wage and small employment effects. Standard economic theory is not hurt if wage
increases do not cause employment decrease but cause price increases.  On the other hand, they help 
to answer the question of who is paying for the minimum wage increase.  Minimum wage increases 
are passed on to prices and are, therefore, born by consumers.  Furthermore, overall prices increase 
and, therefore, all consumers pay for the increase.  The pass-through coefficient is roughly the same
for low, medium and high income consumers in the short run, although slightly larger for lower
income consumers in the long run.  This is an important result because, contrary to what is assumed
in the literature, either low income consumers do not spend a much larger share of their incomes on 
minimum wage labour intensive goods or the prices of such goods do not go up by much more, or 
11both.  In Brazil, because overall prices go up (not only prices of minimum wage labour intensive 
goods), consumers of all income levels (not only low income consumers) spend a substantial share of
their income on goods whose prices went up.
Clearly the potential of the minimum wage to help the poor is bigger under low inflation.  The 
minimum wage price effect is four times smaller in the long run when the high inflation period is
excluded from the analysis.  This, together with the evidence of clustered around zero employment
effects, both in the international and Brazilian literature, suggests that the minimum wage has a
concrete potential to help the poor under low inflation.
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1Table 1 - Effect of a 10% increase in the minimum wage on prices
models medium income low income high income low inflation
static dynamic dynamic dynamic dynamic
short run s. errors short run s. errors long run short run s. errors long run short run s. errors long run short run s. errors long run
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(A) Y=f(L)
(1) Ad Hoc 0.15 0.036
(2) General Equilibrium 0.25 0.064 0.56 0.081 3.07 0.41 0.118 2.91 0.55 0.080 2.88 0.01 0.022 0.72
(3) Imperfect Competition 0.24 0.059 0.50 0.071 2.35 0.42 0.113 2.63 0.48 0.070 2.16 0.01 0.021 0.62
(B) Y=f(L,K)
(1) General Equilibrium 0.09 0.051 0.32 0.064 2.38 0.30 0.110 2.56 0.30 0.062 2.19 0.01 0.022 0.63
(2) Imperfect Competition 0.08 0.050 0.30 0.062 1.98 0.31 0.109 2.42 0.28 0.060 1.78 0.01 0.021 0.59
1) The dependent variable is the difference of logs of prices. The shoch variable is the "fraction at".
2) Control variables depend on the theoretical equation (Sections 3 and 4).  For each production function, two theoretical equations motivate
the estimation of general equilibrium reduced form price equation and imperfect competition profit maximizing condition.
3) Time effects are modelled with year, seasonal-month, stabilization and 1988 structural break dummies.
4) Panels A-B present estimates for two different production functions:  as a function of labour and as a function of labour and capital.
5) Column 1 shows short run coefficient estimates for static models, and column 2 shows short run and long run coefficient estimates from dynamic
models allowing for 12 lags of "fraction at".  Columns 3 and 4 reproduce the dynamic models using alternative price measures for low and high income households.
 Column 5 re-estimates of the model in column (2) using a low inflation subsample.
6) Estimates have been multiplied by 0.3 to indicate the percentual effect on prices of a 10% increase on the nominal minimum wage, which increases "fraction at"
by 0.3 percentage points (Section 4.3).
2